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Case No. 20090507 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Heather Cloward, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of Aggravated 
Exploitation of Prostitution, a second degree felony, in violation ot Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1036 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that 
Defendant was guilty of aggravated exploitation of an underage prostitute? 
Standard of Review. When challenging a trial court's findings of fact on 
appeal, the appellant must show that the findings were clearly erroneous. To 
do so, Defendant must marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then "demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an 
attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,476-77 (Utah 1990). When reviewing a 
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "recites the facts from the 
record most favorable to the findings of the trial court," id. at 476, and sustains 
the trial court's judgment "unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, f 10,999 P.2d 1252 
(citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4) (West 2004): "Sexual 
activity" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any 
sexual act involving the genitals of one person and mouth or anus 
of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(1)(a)(West 2004): A person is 
guilty of prostitution when . . . he engages in any sexual activity 
with another person for a fee;. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(b)(West 2004): A person is 
guilty of exploiting prostitution if he . . . encourages, induces, or 
otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a 
prostitute;... 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306(1) (b) (West 2004): A person is 
guilty of aggravated exploitation [of prostitution] if... the person 
procured, transported, or persuaded or with whom he shares the 
proceeds of prostitution is under eighteen years of age or is the 
wife of the actor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information with one count of aggravated 
exploitation of a prostitute. R. 1. Defendant was convicted as charged 
following a March 19,2009, bench trial. R. 56-57. The Court sentenced 
Defendant to one to 15 years in prison, but suspended that sentence and 
instead imposed a 180-day jail term and 36 months probation. R. 63. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 70. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"[WJlwtever you feel comfortable with . . . " 
CW, a 16-year-old girl, was introduced to Defendant as a 23-year-old 
woman (with a fake ID to prove it) who wanted to work as an escort. R. 
82:124. 
Defendant was happy to oblige. As CW recalled: " [Defendant] kind 
of just talked about, like, the basics of what escorting was. Like she talked 
about how there was a fee—a service fee that you go and collect and that 
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you give a percentage to her, like—I think it was like [$]135 and then you 
gave $70 to her." R. 82:10. 
But CW was told she could earn "tips" beyond the basic fee. R. 82:11. 
Defendant told her that tips could be for "whatever you feel comfortable 
with . . . [Y]ou could do anything you wanted, oral sex, you could do sex." 
Defendant told her to be sure to get paid upfront: "Don't do anything 
without getting tips first." R. 82:11. 
Defendant also cautioned her to always take condoms with her. "She 
said keep them just in case . . . you were going to have sex. Or she said if 
you were going to give a hand job that—put the condom on or if you were 
to give a blowjob to put the condom on. Either way." R. 82:17. 
Tlie sting 
As part of a "sting" operation, Layton Police Detective Todd Derrick 
answered an ad in a weekly newspaper for a "private companion." R. 2. 
Detective Derrick telephoned a number from the ad and arranged for 
"Brittany" to meet him at a Layton motel. Id. Before long, CW appeared at 
Detective Derrick's door. R. 82:18. 
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CW said Detective Derrick proposed various sex acts. "And he had 
[$]500,1 think... And I was like, no, I'm not a full-service girl. I don't do 
sex or anything." Finally, CW agreed to a "massage and a hand job." R. 
82:19. "Once we agreed to it, he took the [$]500 out of his wallet and gave 
it to me . . . I stood up and took my heels off. And then all the cops rushed 
in." R. 82:19-20. 
The officers arrested her and phoned her dad. Then they asked whom 
she was working for. R. 82:20. CW told them that she worked for Defendant. 
She then took them to Defendant's house. R. 82:21. 
Police identified Defendant from the street address and, on March 18, 
2008, Detective Derrick met with Defendant at her home. R. 82:103. The 
detective asked Defendant if she had placed the newspaper ad he had 
responded to. R. 82:104. When Defendant admitted that she had, Detective 
Derrick advised her of her Miranda rights. Id. Defendant declined to speak 
further. Id. 
"\N]ever, ever have sex" 
At trial, Defendant testified that her escorts had discretion in what they 
would agree to do with clients. "[Ijt's all strictly up to the girl. It's all 
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whatever the girl wants to do." She said she told CW that she could do 
massages, "shower shows" and stripteases. She admitted that some clients 
masturbate. R. 82:127. She also admitted that some massages might conclude 
with "a happy ending." R. 82:137. 
However, she claimed that she never told CW to have sex with escort 
clients. "I told her never, ever have sex. Never do oral sex. Never do 
anything like that. You talk the guys out of as much money as you can and do 
as little as you can." R. 82:119. 
Defendant said that there are a lot of misconceptions about escort 
services. "Most of the time, honestly, guys jut want to sit and just talk and 
boob about their problems to a pretty girl for an hour. That's pretty much all it 
is. Honestly, for the most part, most of them just end up being massages." R. 
82:127. 
"Disingenuous" 
The court found Defendant's denials "disingenuous" in light of her 
admission that CW was instructed to do "whatever felt comfortable with": 
[I]t is simply disingenuous to say then with all of that you can do 
whatever you feel comfortable for, get the money, provide the 
services that will get the money, do whatever you feel comfortable 
for, then to argue, oh, but I never said to have sex. 
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R. 82:186. 
The trial court also did not believe Defendant's claim that she didn't 
know CW was under 18. The trial court found that the Identification Card 
offered into evidence by the Defendant pictured a girl who clearly was not 23 
years old, as the birthday on the card indicated. R. 82:187; see also 
"Identification Card" for Kimberly Nicholle Murphy, Defendant's Exhibit 1. 
The Court stated: 
The exhibit that was presented by the defendant is probably the 
most persuasive testimony on that. This is a picture of a very, 
very young girl. Even younger than the . . . witness [CW] 
presents today. The witness is only 17 at this time and was even 
younger at the time that this picture was taken. And to have this 
picture on the same identification card of a date of birth of 1984 
just is not credible. 
R. 82:187. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reject Defendant's sufficiency claim and affirm 
because she has failed to properly marshal the evidence. If this Court excuses 
Defendant's failure to marshal, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial 
court's finding of guilt. Although Defendant denied that she told CW that her 
job involved sex acts with clients, CW provided clear and unequivocal 
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testimony that Defendant told her to do "whatever she felt comfortable with," 
including intercourse, oral sex and masturbation. The trial court found CW's 
testimony credible. The trial court also found that Defendant was not credible 
when she claimed she did not know that CW was underage. Both findings are 
supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY CLAIM, WHERE SHE FAILS 
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE; IN ANY EVENT, THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 
GUILT. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her 
conviction for aggravated exploitation of prostitution. Aplt. Br. at 11-35. This 
Court should decline to review this claim because Defendant has not 
marshaled the evidence. Should this Court excuse Defendant's failure, the 
evidence more than sufficed to support trial court's finding of guilt. 
A. Defendant Has Failed To Marshal The Evidence. 
To prevail on a sufficiency challenge, Defendant must marshal the 
evidence and "demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings . . . " State 
v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Utah 1990). The marshaling burden is 
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difficult. To properly discharge it, the appellant must present, "in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 77,100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). The appellant must then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991). 
It is not enough to "simply provide an exhaustive review of all evidence 
presented at trial." Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 77 (citation omitted). "Rather, 
appellants must provide a precisely focused summary of all the evidence 
supporting the [guilty verdict]." Chen, 2004 UT 82, | 77. Failure to meet the 
marshaling burden is grounds alone for rejecting an attack on the sufficiency 
of the evidence. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant has not" provide [d] a precisely focused summary of all the 
evidence supporting" the guilty verdict. See Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^77. In a 
two-page, sanitized summary of the evidence presented at trial, Defendant 
never acknowledges the most damning testimony against her. See Aplt. Br. at 
10-11. Although she admits she employed CW to work as an escort, she never 
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mentions that CW testified that Defendant instructed her: "You could do 
anything you wanted, oral sex, you could do sex. But she just said whatever 
you feel comfortable." R. 82:11. The closest she comes to acknowledging CW's 
testimony is when she admits that CW "alleged" that Defendant told her to 
take condoms with her when she met with clients. Aplt. Br. at 10. But then 
she follows this admission with a recitation of her own testimony denying 
that she ever discussed condoms. Id. Virtually every time she vaguely 
acknowledges damaging testimony, she immediately follows it with a denial 
or her own favorable testimony. 
Because Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence, this Court 
should reject her sufficiency challenges. "'If the marshaling requirement is 
not met . . . we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings'" 
and may "'affirm . . . on that basis alone.'" Commercial Debenture Corp. v. 
Amenti, Inc, 2010 UT10, «| 14 — P.3d — (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 
U 76,100 P.3d 1177); see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, If 27, 140 P.3d 1200 ("When parties fail to 
[marshal], we can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of 
fact"). 
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B. The Marshaled Evidence Supports Defendant's 
Conviction. 
Should this Court excuse Defendant's failure to marshal, the evidence is 
more than sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for aggravated 
exploitation of a prostitute. 
Escorts are not automatically prostitutes and escort services are not per 
se illegal.1 However, as a number of courts have recognized, "escort services 
generally are fronts for prostitution " United States v. Kinzler, 55 F.3d 70,71 
(2nd Cir. 1995); United States v. Montague, 29 F.3d 317, 319 (7th Cir. 1994) 
("escort businesses generally... are engaged in prostitution"); see also United 
States v. Unnear, 16 M.J. 628,635 (A.C.M.R. 1983) ("[I]n the common parlance 
of our nation, the terms 'escort' or 'escort service' in conversational contexts.. 
. have become socially acceptable synonyms for the terms 'prostitute' or 
'prostitute service.'"). Indeed, as the trial court noted, the escort business is 
carried on in "code." R. 82:186. "The entire system is in codes with a wink." 
Id. 
1
 Defendant acknowledged, however, that her escort service was illegal 
because she did not have a license. R. 82:116. 
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To break that "code" the State was required to prove the elements of 
aggravated exploitation of prostitution—that Defendant "encourage[d], 
induce[d], or otherwise purposely cause[d] [CW] to become or remain a 
prostitute . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). Prostitution includes 
engaging "in any sexual activity with another person for a fee." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1302(1)(a). "Sexual activity" means "acts of masturbation, sexual 
intercourse, or any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4). The state 
must also prove the aggravating element, which in this case is that "the 
person procured, transported, or persuaded or with whom he shared the 
proceeds of prostitution is under eighteen years or age " Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-1306 (West 2004). 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that Defendant 
was guilty of aggravated exploitation of prostitution. CW testified that 
Defendant told her "you could do anything you wanted, oral sex, you could 
do sex. But she just said whatever you feel comfortable." R. 82:11. Defendant 
testified that she told CW she would be expected to be nude some times, give 
massages, and perform "strip teases" and "shower shows." R. 82:126. "[I]t's 
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all strictly up to the girl. It's all whatever the girl wants to do." R. 82:127. 
Still, Defendant counseled CW:" [I]f the money isn't right then don't do it." R. 
82:122. 
Defendant insists she told CW that "whatever the girl wants to do" did 
not include having sex, although she acknowledged that a "happy ending" 
(masturbation) was a possibility. R. 82:137. Defendant claims that she never 
told CW that having sex was part of the job. "I told her no, do not at all." R. 
82:127. 
The court found these denials "disingenuous" in light of Defendant's 
admission that CW was instructed to do whatever felt comfortable: "[I]t is 
simply disingenuous to say then with all of that you can do whatever you feel 
comfortable for, get the money, provide the services that will get the money, 
do whatever you feel comfortable for, then to argue, oh, but I never said to 
have sex." R. 82:186; see Pitt v. Taron, 2009 UT App 113, If 2 n. 1,210 P.3d 962 
("As the trier of fact in a bench trial, the trial court is in the best position to 
weigh conflicting evidence and the credibility of witnesses" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, f 30, n.10, 
173 P.3d 865 (" [I]t is the trial court's role to assess witness credibility, given its 
13 
advantaged position to observe testimony first hand, and normally, we will 
not second guess the trial court's findings in this regard") (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant also claims that she was unaware CW was underage. 
Defendant claims that the first time they met, she told CW she had to be 18 to 
work as an escort. R. 82:123. CW identified herself as Kimberly Murphy and 
presented ID indicating she was 23. R. 82:124-24; see also "Identification Card" 
for Kimberly Nicholle Murphy, Defendant's Exhibit 1. Defendant claimed 
that the ID convinced her that CW was 23. "I wanted to be able to know for a 
fact that that's how old they were. I had to make sure." R. 82:125. 
The trial court did not believe these claims, mainly because the 
Identification Card proffered by the Defendant pictured a girl who was clearly 
underage, even though the birthdate indicated she was 23. "The exhibit that 
was presented by the defendant is probably the most persuasive testimony on 
that. This is a picture of a very, very young girl. Even younger than the. . . 
witness presents today." R. 82:187. This finding cannot be clearly erroneous 
because a reviewing court must defer to the fact-finder's firsthand 
observations of the witness and its assessment of how her appearance 
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contrasted with the girl depicted on the ID card. See, e.g., Hal Taylor Associates 
v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743,749 (Utah 1982) ("Where the evidence is in 
conflict, we defer to the trial court's first-hand assessment of the witnesses' 
credibility and assume that the trial court believed those aspects of the 
evidence which support its findings"). 
Defendant attempts to sidestep the clear import of the evidence by 
arguing that her conduct with regard to CW was at most reckless and, 
therefore, does not meet the mental state for violating the statute. Under Utah 
law, a statute that does not explicitly state a culpable mental state has the 
mental states of intentional, knowing or reckless. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
102 (West 2004). But Defendant claims the exploiting prostitution statute 
explicitly states a culpable mental state because "encourage[ing], induc[ing], 
or otherwise -purposely causfing] another to become or remain a prostitute." 
means intentional or knowing conduct. See Aplt. Br. at 13-21; see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1305 (emphasis added). Thus, Defendant argues, unless her 
conduct was intentional or knowing, she could not be guilty of exploiting 
prostitution. 
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This claim is unpreserved and cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Cntr., 2005 UT App 352, ^ f 6, n.5,121 
P.3d 74 ("[W]e do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal 
that have not been properly preserved or raised below"); see also Coleman v. 
Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9,17 P.3d 1122 (refusing to "consider matters raised for 
the first time in the reply brief"). Defendant acknowledges as much, but 
suggests that there was no need to preserve it because Utah law contains an 
exception to the preservation rule for bench trials. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (citing 
State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, If 9, n.4., 999 P.2d 1252, and rule 52(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure). However, Larsen and rule 52(b) allow this 
exception only when the appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Rule 52(b) states: 
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the actions tried by 
the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether 
or not the party raising the question has made in the district court 
an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to 
amend them, a motion for judgment, or motion for a new trial. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) (emphasis added).2 Here, Defendant does not attack the 
sufficiency of the evidence; rather, she argues that the trial court applied the 
wrong legal standard—i.e., the appropriate mental state—in finding her 
guilty. She was required to point out the correct legal standard below. 
Having failed to do so, she cannot assign error on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1981) (defendant cannot raise legal challenge 
concerning culpable mental state where claim was not "specifically or 
distinctly stated to the court below"). 
In any event, this Court need not decide this question because, as noted 
above, the evidence established that Defendant explicitly instructed CW that 
she was free to do "whatever she felt comfortable with," including sexual 
intercourse, oral sex and masturbation. Such evidence clearly supports the 
finding that Defendant was guilty of intentionally or knowingly exploiting 
2
 The continuing validity of the Larsen rule has been called into question 
by more recent case law. See, e.g., 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f^ 
50,52,55,56,99 P.3d 801 (holding that even where the plaintiff objected to the 
findings of fact orally and in two post-trial motions, the argument that the 
findings were insufficiently detailed had been waived because the objections 
were not specific enough to alert the trial court to this particular concern). 
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prostitution, by encouraging, inducing or otherwise purposely causing CW to 
become or remain a prostitute. 
Finally, even if this Court reaches Defendant's argument, her 
interpretation of the statute is incorrect. Defendant argues that the phrase 
"purposely caused" should be interpreted to mean "intentionally or 
knowingly caused." See e.g., Aplt. Br. at 15. But even if this interpretation 
were correct, it does not require that the same culpable mental state be 
attached to other language in the statute stating that a defendant is guilty of 
exploiting a prostitute if he or she "encourages" or "induces" another person 
to become or remain a prostitute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1)(b). The 
word "purposely" comes after "encouraging" and "induces," but immediately 
precedes "otherwise causing" someone to become or remain a prostitute. 
Thus, "purposely" modifies only "otherwise causing" someone to become or 
remain a prostitute. In other words, even if "purposely" causing someone to 
become or remain a prostitute must be intentional or knowing, 
encouragement or inducement may be done intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly. 
18 
This interpretation finds support in case law interpreting similar 
statutory language. In general, similar statutory language should be 
interpreted similarly. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 260 (2005) 
(" [W]here two statutes use similar language we generally take this as 'a strong 
indication that [they] should be interpreted pari passu'") (quoting Northcross v. 
Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)). Utah's 
accomplice liability statute states that a person who "solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a part for 
such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recently stated that "intentionally" modifies and applies only to "aids" and 
not the preceding proscribed acts. Thus, while the acts of soliciting, 
requesting, commanding or encouraging may be done intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly, the act of "intentionally aiding" someone in the 
commission of a crime must be done intentionally. State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, [^ 
50, — P.3d —. Thus, even if, as Defendant argues, "purposely causes" 
requires a mens rea of knowing or intentional, the other culpable acts — 
encouraging or inducing —come under the "default" provision of Utah Code 
19 
Ann. § 76-2-202 and may be committed knowingly, intentionally or recklessly. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004) (defendant is reckless when he 
or she "is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted August «* ,2010. 
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